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Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: Denying
the Equality of Effect in the Right to
Contract
I. Introduction
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,1 the Supreme Court
upheld its 1976 landmark decision in Runyon v. McCrary2 by
finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits private racial discrimi-
nation in the making and enforcement of contracts. The defend-
ant, a private employer, had argued that section 1981 could be
invoked only if the state had engaged in the alleged discrimina-
tion, the interpretation given to section 1981 prior to Runyon.4
Relying primarily on the principles of stare decisis, the Supreme
Court declined to resurrect the state action requirement.5 How-
ever, the Court narrowly construed the language of section
1981's contract clause, limiting its scope so that only discrimina-
tory behavior which precedes the formation of the contract is
prohibited; discriminatory behavior by a party to the contract
after the contract has been formed is not prohibited by section
1981. The Court held that acts of racial harassment by an em-
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
2. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
3. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
. 4. The question of whether Runyon should be overturned, however, was raised ini-
tially not by the defendant, but by the Court, sua sponte, in an order for reargument.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988). See infra notes 156-69 and ac-
companying text.
5. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. -at 2370. See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
6. 109 S. Ct. at 2372-73. Thus, a § 1981 action may still be brought by parents whose
children have been denied admission to a private school because they are black, and by a
black employee who alleges that her employer failed to promote her because of her race.
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ployer against his employee are not actionable under section
1981 because such acts occur after the employment contract has
been entered into, and because postformation conduct, no mat-
ter how egregious, does not abridge the right to enter into the
contract." Thus, the Patterson Court preserved a potent remedy
against private racial discrimination, but narrowed its applica-
tion, prompting Justice Brennan to observe in his dissent,
"What the Court declines to snatch away with one hand, it takes
with the other."
Through its ruling, the Supreme Court restricted the reme-
dies available to victims of racial harassment and disparate
treatment in both employment and nonemployment settings.' In
an employment setting, for example, an employee who suffers
racial harassment, though she may still maintain a Title VII
claim, cannot be compensated for her suffering or for back pay
beyond two years.' 0 In a nonemployment setting, a private
school still may not deny admission to children because of their
7. Id. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
8. 109 S. Ct. at 2379. The Court also held that an employee bringing a § 1981 claim
of discrimination in promotion is not required to show that she was better qualified than
the person chosen for the position in order to prove that the employer's claim that he
promoted the better qualified candidate was pretextual. The Court held that the em-
ployee can instead present evidence of the employer's past treatment of the employee,
including instances of racial harassment. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. This
Note does not explore this aspect of Patterson's claim in depth.
9. There is, in employment settings, some overlap of remedies between § 1981 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000aa-12 (1988). See
infra note 10.
That employment-related racial harassment was cognizable under Title VII was not
disputed ii Patterson; however, the petitioner was precluded from bringing a Title VII
claim because the statute of limitations had expired. See infra note 131 and accompany-
ing text. Other forms of discrimination are cognizable only under § 1981: racial discrimi-
nation by a private school, for example. See infra notes 93-100.
10. Section 1981 is a more potent remedy against employment related racial dis-
crimination than is Title VII, in six principal ways: (1) section 1981 contains no exhaus-
tion requirement whereby a plaintiff is required to file a complaint with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) review board, which may or may not then
grant plaintiff the right to sue; (2) the forum's statute of limitations governing personal
injury actions applies and is often longer than the 180 days provided by Title VII; (3) a
claimant has the right to a jury trial; (4) section 1981 relief is not limited to equitable
relief; (5) section 1981 does not limit the period for which back pay can be awarded; and
(6) as noted in the text above, remedies may include compensatory and, in some cases,
punitive damages. Blum, Section 1981 Revisited: Looking Beyond Runyon and Patter-
son, 32 How. L. 1, 13 (1989).
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race; it may, however, maintain segregated classrooms.1
The Court's decision in Patterson to exclude racial harass-
ment from the scope of conduct prohibited by section 1981 is
flawed in several respects. First, postformation conduct may be
evidence of discriminatory intent that existed prior to contract
formation."2 Second, if a party to an employment contract is an
at-will employee, she and her employer are continuously remak-
ing their contract whenever new duties are assigned; in this set-
ting, ongoing racial harassment precedes each new contract. 13
Third, by excluding postformation conduct from review, the
Court departed from precedent established in similar civil rights
cases, notably section 1982 actions,"' in which the Court recog-
nized that the equal right to act (for example, to contract, to
enter into a lease) includes the right to have that act end in an
equal effect. In earlier section 1981 and 1982 cases, the Court
looked beyond the explicit right to act and found that when the
effects of two identical acts were not equal, there was no equal-
ity between the acts themselves. 5 The Patterson Court excluded
postformation conduct from the scope of section 1981, and with
it all evidence pertaining to the effect of the contract. Thus, the
plaintiff was denied the equality of effect that necessarily ac-
companies every right.
This Note explores the Patterson Court's decision to deny
the plaintiff the equal effect of her employment contract. Part II
begins by examining the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the progenitor of sections 1981 and 1982. The inter-
pretive treatment that these sections have received in the last
twenty-five years of civil rights litigation, most notably those de-
cisions in which the Court has held that they prohibit private
discrimination, is also examined. Also discussed in Part II are
the cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized that if
there is inequality among the effects of two similar acts, the
11. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
12. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2389 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See infra notes 192-97.
13. 109 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 199-204.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988): "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
15. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
1991]
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equal right to act has been abridged. The facts and holding of
Patterson v. McLean are set forth in Part III, while Part IV ex-
amines the Court's narrow construction of the contract clause of
section 1981. Part IV also presents a framework for analyzing
whether the inequality of effect between two protected acts is
sufficiently severe as to give rise to a civil rights cause of action.
In Part V, this Note concludes that the Court's decision to deny
employees who are victims of racial harassment the use of sec-
tion 1981, is inconsistent with its previous decisions.
II. Background
A. Introduction
The Civil Rights Act of 1866,16 enacted in the aftermath of
the Civil War, was designed to ensure the political and economic
16. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (reenacted by the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870)) (codified in Revised Statutes of 1874 §§ 1977-1978
(1875), recodified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1982)).
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared
to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and pen-
alties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the
contrary not withstanding.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3215 (1866) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see C.
FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION 1864-1888, PART ONE (1971). For an analysis of the legislative history re-
lied on in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), see Kennedy, Reconstruction and
the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521 (1989); Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction,
Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541 (1989);
Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative
History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565 (1989). See also Frankel, Run-
yon v. McCrary Should Not Be Overruled, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1989); Rotunda, Runyon
v. McCrary And The Mosaic of State Action, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 47 (1989), For a criticism
of the Court's interpretation of the intent of the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
see McClellan, The Foibles and Fables of Runyon, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 13 (1989). For an
analysis which focuses on the modes of statutory interpretation that have been used by
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/6
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freedom of newly freed black Americans against both state and
private conduct intended to deprive them of these freedoms.17
The Act contained, among other provisions, a clause that was
intended to guarantee black Americans the same right to "make
and enforce" contracts as was enjoyed by white citizens.' 8 In ad-
dition, it guaranteed the newly freed persons the "equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty" as was enjoyed by whites.' 9
The Act was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the
thirteenth amendment.20 It was revised in 18742 and was used
sporadically against private and state discriminatory conduct
until the beginning of this century, when it fell into disuse.2
With the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,"3 section 1981 and other Reconstruction Era civil rights
laws experienced a rebirth, and the victims of racial discrimina-
tion were able to employ them with increasing success. 4 Clearly,
the Court in considering these civil rights cases, see Farber, Statutory Interpretation,
Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2 (1988); Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988). For a thorough analysis of the history and applica-
tion of § 1981, see Comment, Developments in the Law - Section 1981, 15 HA.v. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 29 (1980); see also Blum, Section 1981 Revisited: Looking Beyond Runyon
and Patterson, 32 How. L.J. 1 (1989). For a history of the Reconstruction period, see
generally E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988).
17. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Black
Codes, state laws passed to restrict the economic freedom of blacks in Southern states.
18. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
19. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
20. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 127. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 59-61.
22. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982). See supra note 14. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392-U.S. 409 (1968), the Court held that § 1982 prohibits all discrimination against
blacks - private discrimination as well as public - in the sale or rental of property.
See infra notes 69-88 and accompanying text.
Another Reconstruction Era civil rights statute to reappear after Brown was 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), originally enacted as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Section 1985(3)
provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws ... the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
5
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the most significant development in civil rights jurisprudence
has been the use of the Reconstruction Era laws against wholly
private conduct."
B. Badges of Slavery: The Black Codes and Private
Discrimination
The most notorious examples of state-sponsored discrimina-
tion during the reconstruction period were the Black
Codes - laws passed by eight Southern states soon after the
end of the Civil War." Ostensibly intended to enumerate the
new rights and responsibilities of freed persons, the Black Codes
were an attempt to circumvent the thirteenth amendment by
creating de facto servitude through laws that severely restricted
such economic freedoms as the right to contract and the right to
acquire and own property.2 7 Under the codes, blacks were for-
bidden to rent land; they were barred from any occupation but
farming; they were required to sign yearly contracts, the terms
of which included their working from sunup to sundown, and "a
ban on leaving the plantation, or entertaining guests upon it,
without permission of the employer." 8 A Florida Code went so
far as to make acts of disrespect to a white employer a crime. 9
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
As it did for §s 1981 and 1982, the Court has eliminated the state action require-
ments from § 1985(3). In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court held that
§ 1985(3) may.be used against private persons who conspire to deprive another of the
equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.
25. See generally Rotunda, supra note 16.
26. Those states included Virginia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Alabama,
North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 110-17.
27. The Black Codes were, in the words of one historian, an
[a]ttempt to stabilize the black work force and limit its economic options apart
from plantation labor .... [T]he state would enforce labor agreements and plan-
tation discipline, punish those who refused to contract, and prevent whites from
competing among themselves for black workers. The codes amply fulfilled Radical
Benjamin F. Flanders' prediction as Louisiana's legislature assembled: "Their
whole thought and time will be given to plans for getting things back as near to
slavery as possible."
FONER, supra note 16, at 199.
28. Id. at 200. Fairman maintains that the Black Codes seem less shocking when
considered in the context of the era: "If the terms [of the Black Codes] seem hard, as
they were, one should in fairness recall the toil of men, women, and children in Northern
factories at that period." FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 111.
29. FONER, supra note 16, at 200. A code in Louisiana provided: "No negro or freed-
[Vol. 11:411
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Newly freed persons were also subjected to private racial
discrimination that deprived them of their economic freedom. 0
Though the Black Codes were a form of state sponsored discrim-
ination, their purpose was to facilitate private discrimination by
white plantation owners.31 The right to contract meant only the
right to accept the terms offered by the white employer.3 2 The
employer could ultimately set wages and determine the length of
employment.8 These examples of private discrimination have
been relied on by the Court in finding that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and its progeny were intended by their framers to apply
to private as well as state sponsored discrimination.3 4
C. Congressional Response: The Civil Rights Act of 1866
The prospects of economic freedom were bleak for newly
freed black persons in the South during the months following
the end of the Civil War. State and private discrimination com-
man shall be permitted to rent or keep a house within the limits of the town [of Opelou-
sas] under any circumstances, and any one thus offending shall be ejected and compelled
to find an employer .... ." The Schurz Report, S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
24 (1865) [hereinafter Schurz Report], reported in AvINs, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMEND-
MENT DEBATES 90 (1967).
30. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
31. For example, a Mississippi statute provided that the freedman had to contract
with a white employer for a year's work and
that if the [black] laborer shall quit the service of the employer before expiration
of his term of service, without just cause, he shall forfeit his wages for that year up
to the time of quitting.
That every civil officer shall, and every person may, arrest and carry back to
his or her legal employer any freedman, free negro, or mulatto, who shall have
quit the service of his or her employer before the expiration of his term of service,
without good cause ....
That upon the affidavit made by the employer of any freedman ... that any
freedman... legally employed by said employer has legally deserted said employ-
ment, [the] justice of the peace . .. shall issue his warrant or warrants. .. directed
to any sheriff, constable, or special deputy, commanding him to arrest said de-
serter and return him to said employer ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 39 (1865).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Justice Stewart looked at these examples in Jones: "The congressional debates
are replete with references to private injustices against Negroes - references to white
employers who refuse to pay their Negro workers, white planters who agreed among
themselves not to hire freed slaves without the permission of their former masters .... "
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 427 (1968). See infra notes 69-88 and accom-
panying text.
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bined to create an environment of oppression that was indistin-
guishable from slavery. Members of the Republican-controlled
House and Senate began an investigation into reports of racial
discrimination. 5 Their findings led them to believe that the eco-
nomic freedoms of black persons could only be ensured by pro-
viding them with a federal cause of action against those who
would deny blacks the same economic freedoms guaranteed to
whites.36
1. The Schurz Report
In the fall of 1865, President Andrew Johnson dispatched
Major General Carl Schurz to the South to assess the extent of
white resistance to emancipation. Schurz toured South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana and reported his
findings of conditions there to President Johnson, who transmit-
ted Schurz's report to Congress on December 19, 1865.17 The
Schurz Report described at length the ill treatment newly freed
black persons were suffering at the hands of the white popula-
tion. 8 Schurz found that the states and their white landowners
had created a new form of slavery by depriving blacks of the
economic rights enjoyed by whites.3 9
Motivated by the belief that "you cannot make the Negro
work without physical compulsion," landowners used violence
and intimidation against blacks.' ° The Schurz Report was widely
35. Jones at 427.
36. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
37. Schurz Report, supra note 29.
38. Id. at 16-45.
39. Schurz wrote:
The negro is not only not permitted to be idle, but he is positively prohibited from
working or carrying on a business for himself; he is compelled to be in the "regu-
lar service" of a white man, and if he has no employer he is compelled to find one.
. . . If he should attempt to leave his employer on account of non-payment of
wages or bad treatment he is compelled to find another one; and if no other will
take him he will be compelled to return to him from whom he wanted to escape.
The employers, under such circumstances, are naturally at liberty to arrange the
matter of compensation according to their tastes, for the negro will be compelled
to be in the regular service of an employer, whether he receives wages or not.
Schurz Report, supra note 29, at 24 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 16. Schurz noted:
[T]here appears to be another popular notion prevalent in the South, which
stands as no less serious an obstacle in the way of a successful solution of the
[Vol. 11:411
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quoted in the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866,41 and
has been relied on by the Supreme Court as support for the pro-
position that the authors of the Act intended it to encompass
acts of private racial discrimination. 2
2. The Freedmen's Bureau Bill of 1866
The Freedmen's Bureau Bill of 1866 was the first legislative
effort proposed pursuant to Congress' power under the thir-
teenth amendment to protect the rights of blacks. The Republi-
can-controlled House and Senate passed the bill in February
1866, but it was vetoed by President Andrew Johnson.'
The Freedmen's Bureau was the administrative agency cre-
ated in March 1865 to assist newly freed blacks with problems
encountered after emancipation. It distributed food, clothing,
and fuel to former slaves." The Bureau was to last one year, but
problem. It is that the negro exists for the special object of raising cotton, rice and
sugar for the whites, and that it is illegitimate for him to indulge, like other peo-
ple, in the pursuit of his own happiness in his own way. Although it is admitted
that he has ceased to be the property of a master, it is not admitted that he has a
right to become his own master. As Colonel Thomas, assistant commissioner of
the Freedman's Bureau in Mississippi, in a letter addressed to me, very pungently
expresses it: "The whites esteem the blacks their property by natural right, and,
however much they may admit that the relations of masters and slaves have been
destroyed by the war and by the President's emancipation proclamation, they still
have an ingrained feeling that the blacks at large belong to the whites at large,
and whenever opportunity serves, they treat the colored people just as their profit,
caprice or passion may dictate .... An ingrained feeling like this is apt to bring
forth that sort of class legislation which produces laws to govern one class with no
other view than to benefit another. This tendency can be distinctly traced in the
various schemes for regulating labor which here and there see the light."
Id. at 21.
41. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 428 (1968) (Justice Stewart
called the Schurz Report "one of the most comprehensive studies then before Congress.
."). But see AvINs, supra note 29:
At the opening of the 39th Congress, the Republicans were inflamed by the Schurz
Report which, although a rabidly partisan document, was widely reprinted and
circulated throughout the country. Although much of the material therein con-
sisted of hearsay, opinion, and speculation, it was believed by members of Con-
gress and other Republicans throughout the country, and acted on.
Id. at vi.
43. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 126.
44. FONER, supra note 16, at 69.
Despite its unprecedented responsibilities and powers, the Bureau was clearly en-
visioned as a temporary expedient, for not only was its. life span limited to one
9
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Republican members of Congress sought an extension of the Bu-
reau's longevity and authority so as to further protect blacks.
The Freedmen's Bureau Bill of 1866 was also Congress' first at-
tempt to reverse the discriminatory effects of the Black Codes.
For, in addition to extending the Bureau's longevity, the Bill
would also "enact that wherever the Negro was denied civil
rights accorded to the whites, 'military protection and jurisdic-
tion' would be extended over him.' 4
5
To the surprise of its Republican sponsors, President John-
son vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill.' 6 After failing to over-
ride Johnson's veto, Congress turned its attention in March 1866
to the measure that had been the companion bill to the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill: the Civil Rights Act.'7
year, but, incredibly, no budget was appropriated - it would have to draw funds
and staff from the War Department. [Senator] Charles Sumner had proposed es-
tablishing the Bureau as a permanent agency with a secretary of Cabinet
rank - an institutionalization of the nation's responsibility to the freed-
men - but such an idea ran counter to strong inhibitions against long-term
guardianship.
Id. at 69.
45. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 125. Section 7 of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill
provided:
Whenever in any State or district in which the ordinary course of judicial proceed-
ings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and wherein, in consequence of any
State or local law, ordinance, police or other regulation, custom, or prejudice, any
of the civil rights or immunities belonging to white persons (including the right to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to have full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate)
are refused or denied to negroes, mulattoes, freedmen, refugees, or any other per-
sons, on account of race, color, or any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude .. . it is to be the duty of the President of the United States . . . to
extend military protection and jurisdiction over all cases affecting such persons so
discriminated against.
S. 60, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866), reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 209
(1866) (emphasis added). See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
46. Johnson explained his reasons for vetoing the Freedman's Bill:
Competition for the freedman's services .. .will enable him to command almost
his own terms. He also possesses a perfect right to change his place of abode; and
if, therefore, he does not find in one community or state a mode of life suited to
his desires, or proper remuneration for his labor, he can move to another, where
that labor is more esteemed and better rewarded.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 918 (1866).
47. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 127.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/6
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3. The Debates
Like the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was introduced by Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois.4 8
Trumbull opened the debates by introducing the bill as the most
important measure since the enactment of the thirteenth
amendment.49 He said that the bill was
intended to give effect to that declaration [the thirteenth amend-
ment] and secure to all persons within the United States practical
freedom. There is very little importance in the general declaration
of abstract truths and principles unless they can be carried into
effect, unless the persons who are to be affected by them have
some means of availing themselves of their benefits .... It is the
intention of this bill to secure these rights.6 0
The authority under which Congress sought to guarantee
the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act was the thirteenth
amendment.51 Section 1 of the amendment abolished slavery;
section 2 gave Congress the power to enforce section 1 "by ap-
propriate legislation." ' Thus, Congressional authority to enact
civil rights statutes under the thirteenth amendment was depen-
dent upon whether those laws brought about the abolition of
slavery. This required the authors of the Civil Rights Act to
make some imaginative, though tenable, arguments. In citing
section 2 as authority to proscribe racial discrimination, Trum-
bull explained that certain forms of discriminatory conduct were
"badge[s] of servitude," which the thirteenth amendment abol-
ished as it abolished slavery."'
48. Id. Foner describes Trumbull as a moderate: "By no means an [early] advocate
of black suffrage, Trumbull became convinced that further measures to protect blacks'
civil rights, encourage Southern Unionism, and suppress violence were necessary before
the South could resume its place in national life." FONER, supra note 16, at 226.
49. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
50. Id.
51. Id. The thirteenth amendment provides:
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
52. Id.
53. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
1991]
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The congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866
reveal two principal concerns of the members of the 39th Con-
gress.5" First, the Republican majority sought to protect the eco-
nomic freedom of southern blacks from the explicitly discrimi-
natory Black Codes. 5 Second, both Democratic and Republican
members were concerned about whether Congress had the au-
thority to enact such a bill.6 6 After three weeks of debate, Con-
gress resolved the second issue by adopting Trumbull's "badges"
theory regarding Congress' power under the thirteenth amend-
ment, and voted in favor of the bill.5 1 Once again, President
Johnson vetoed the measure; but this time Congress mustered
the votes needed to override the veto, and the Civil Rights Act
became law on April 9, 1866.58
D. Reenactment
In the spring of 1866, only the Civil Rights Act protected
newly freed blacks from the discriminatory Black Codes enacted
by the southern states. But that protection would last only as
long as the Republicans maintained a majority in Congress;
Republicans believed that a Congress controlled by Democrats
would surely repeal the Civil Rights Act.59 In 1868, Congress
sought to ensure that the rights protected by the Civil Rights
Act would not easily be stripped away; it did so by enacting the
54. See generally id. at 474-79.
55. Senator Lane of Indiana stated: "But why do we legislate upon this subject now?
Simply because we fear and have reason to fear that the emancipated slaves would not
have their rights in the courts of the slave States." Id. at 602.
Congressman Phelps of Maryland stated:
I believe that these freedmen ought to be protected by the government. I believe
that they ought to be encouraged to labor and to earn their livelihood as well as to
learn; that they ought to be protected in their rights under contract, and espe-
cially from the danger of being reduced by any process, direct or circuitous, to the
condition of slavery from which we have rescued them.
Id. at 75.
56. See FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 127-31.
57. Id. at 127.
58. Johnson believed that the bill would hurt race relations and that it would lead
also to an undesirable expansion of federal power. Id. at 128.
59. Representative Garfield of Ohio, later President Garfield, said in May: "The civil
rights bill is now a part of the law of the land. But every gentleman knows it will cease to
be part of the law whenever the sad moment arrives when. .. [the Democrats] come into
power." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866).
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fourteenth amendment. 0 In 1870, Congress passed a new Civil
Rights Act pursuant to its powers under the fourteenth amend-
ment and, in it, reenacted the entire Civil Rights Act of 1866."
60. Id. The first section of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61. Section 18 of the Civil Righta Act of 1870 provided: "[T]he act to protect all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindica-
tion, passed April nine, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted .... " Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144.
Unfortunately, the Civil Rights Act of 1870 is not the last link between the original
Act and the statute's codification as 42 U.S.C. § 1981; that link is found in a poorly
drafted 1874 revision. In an attempt to "revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all
statutes of the United States," Congress passed a statute in 1866 that created a three-
man commission to revise the federal code. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74. The
Revised Statutes were approved by Congress in 1874. Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, 18
Stat. 113. A historical note that accompanied § 1977 (later § 1981) provided that the
section was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1870, whereas the historical note for the
section that later became § 1982 indicates it was derived from the 1866 Act. In other
words, according to the historical notes written by the commission, § 1982 was passed
under the thirteenth amendment, while § 1981 was passed under the fourteenth amend-
ment. This distinction profoundly affects the respective scopes of the two statutes, be-
cause the Supreme Court has held that state action is a requirement of laws promulgated
under the fourteenth amendment but is not required for those laws promulgated under
the thirteenth amendment. Slaughter-House Cases, 77 U.S. 273 (1869); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). If the commission's notations are correct, then § 1982 may
prohibit private acts of discrimination, while § 1981 may only prohibit state-sponsored
discrimination, even though they both originated from the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Generally, most jurists and commentators believe that the omission of any reference
in § 1981 to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the result of oversight or carelessness on the
part of the revision commission, rather than an expression of an intent by Congress to
limit the scope of § 1981. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976) ("To
hold [that section 1981 was derived solely from the fourteenth amendment] would be to
attribute to Congress an intent to repeal a major piece of Reconstruction legislation on
the basis of an unexplained omission from the revisers' marginal notes."). For a discus-
sion of the 1874 revision of § 1981, see Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination:
An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1036-39
(1972). Nonetheless, not all are convinced that the description of the statutes in the
commission's notes was merely an oversight. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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E. The Fall and Rise of Section 1981
As did many of the Reconstruction Era civil rights stat-
utes,62 section 1981 actions disappeared almost entirely between
the latter part of the last century and the 1940s, only to experi-
ence a rebirth as an effective remedy against state and, ulti-
mately, private discrimination."
1. From Hodges to Brown
In Hodges v. United States,4 the Court held that the thir-
teenth amendment and the laws passed to enforce it could pro,
tect persons only against involuntary servitude, 5 thus rejecting
Senator Trumbull's broad "badges of servitude" theory.6 6 Sec-
tion 1981 would not be used again in any significant way until
after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,67 when racial equality and civil rights began to emerge as
salient public issues."
2. The Modern Era: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 emerged from its long dor-
mancy 102 years after it was enacted with the Court's decision
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.e" In Jones, a private real estate
corporation refused to sell a home to Jones and his family be-
cause they were black. Jones sought injunctive and other relief
under section 1982,70 claiming that his right to purchase prop-
erty was abridged because of his race.71 The District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the case,72 and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section
62. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, 1985(3) (1988).
63. See infra notes 69-111 and accompanying text.
64. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
65. Id. at 4.
66. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. For a discussion of the civil rights movement of the period, see BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-1963 (1988).
69. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
71. 392 U.S. at 412.
72. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966), afPd, 379 F.2d
33 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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1982 did not reach private refusals to sell property. 73
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1982 pro-
hibits private discrimination against blacks who wish to buy or
rent property.7' Like section 1981, section 1982 was derived from
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,7' and the Court relied heavily on
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act in finding that sec-
tion 1982 prohibited private racial discrimination.7 That inter-
pretation, although often criticized," has been relied upon in
subsequent decisions involving sections 1981 and 1982.78
The Jones Court began its interpretation of section 1982 by
examining the language of the statute. The Court concluded that
"[o]n its face ... § 1982 appears to prohibit all discrimination
against Negroes in the sale or rental of prop-
erty - discrimination by private owners as well as discrimina-
tion by public authorities. ' '7 e Next, the Court examined the leg-
islative history of section 1982 and found that the debates
revealed the intent that the statute reach private racial discrimi-
nation.80 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart noted that
the 39th Congress, in addition to responding to the recently en-
acted Black Codes,81 "also had before it an imposing body of
evidence pointing to the mistreatment of Negroes by private in-
dividuals and unofficial groups, mistreatment unrelated to any
hostile state legislation,"82 and concluded, "[iln this setting, it
73. 379 F.2d 33 (1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
74. 392 U.S. at 421.
75. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
76. 392 U.S. at 423 n.30. See infra note 77.
77. One commentator has written of the Court's conclusion that the 39th Congress
intended that the Act apply to private as well as state sponsored discrimination: "[T]he
Court ignored well-established principles of statutory construction, distorted the legisla-
tive history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and disregarded its own precedents." McClel-
lan, supra note 16, at 31.
78. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
79. 392 U.S. at 421 (emphasis in original).
80. Id. at 422-37.
The congressional debates are replete with references to private injustices against
Negroes - references to white employers who refused to pay their Negro work-
ers, white planters who agreed among themselves not to hire freed slaves without
the permission of their former masters, white citizens who assaulted Negroes or
who combined to drive them out of their communities.
Id. at 427-28.
81. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
82. 392 U.S. at 427 (emphasis in original). The Court also gave great weight to the
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would have been strange indeed if Congress had viewed its task
as encompassing merely the nullification of racist laws in former
rebel States."88 Justice Stewart also found persuasive Senator
Trumbull's mild criticism of a measure that had come before the
39th Congress that would have invalidated the Black Codes.'
Trumbull found the bill too limited in scope, and he promised
that if conditions in the South remained unchanged, Congress
should, after the thirteenth amendment was adopted, enact leg-
islation that was "much more sweeping and efficient than the
bill under consideration," - in other words a bill that
reached private discrimination as well as discrimination by the
state.
Finally, the Court held that Congress possessed the power
to proscribe public and private racial discrimination in the sale
and rental of property by noting that "Congress has the power
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what
are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to
translate that determination into effective legislation."8 6
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan found that the de-
bates "do not, as the Court would have it, overwhelmingly sup-
language of the Freedmen's Bill, which provided, among other things, that military juris-
diction would be extended over parts of the South where, "in consequence of any State
or local law .... custom, or prejudice, any of the civil rights .. .belonging to white
persons (including the right... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property ... ) are refused or denied to negroes ..... Id. at 423 n.30 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129, 209) (1866) (emphasis added by Jones Court).
The Court found that the language "custom or prejudice," in this context, characterized
the behavior of private persons and that, therefore, the authors intended that the Act
should encompass private acts of discrimination as well as those carried out by the state.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
83. 392 U.S. at 429.
84. Id. at 430.
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 440. Justice Stewart continued:
Nor can we say that the determination Congress has made is an irrational one. For
this Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have encompassed,
the badges and incidents of slavery - its "burdens and disabilities" - included
restraints upon "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom,
namely, the same right.., to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens." . . . Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil
War to restrict the free exercise of those rights, were substitutes for the slave
system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute
for the Black Codes.
Id. at 440-42 (citations omitted).
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port the result reached by the Court, and in fact ... a contrary
conclusion may equally well be drawn. '8 7 Justice Harlan cited
excerpts from the debates which tended to show that it was the
belief of at least some of the bill's supporters that the Civil
Rights Act was to be applied exclusively against discriminatory
state conduct."
3. Private Discrimination and Employment: Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,89 the Court ex-
amined section 1981's applicability to private employment con-
tracts. In Johnson, the Court held that the statute of limitations
for a section 1981 action was not tolled by the timely filing of a
Title VII claim, and that the plaintiff was therefore barred from
suing under section 1981.90 Although the action was barred as to
that plaintiff, the Court declared that section 1981 could apply
to racial discrimination in private employment:
Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled
among the Federal Courts of Appeals - and we now join
them - that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimina-
tion in private employment on the basis of race. An individual
who establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both
equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under cer-
87. Id. at 454.
88. Id. at 467. The remarks of Representative Shellabarger, a strong supporter of
the Civil Rights Act and later sponsor of the Ku Klux Klan Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1988)), are especially persuasive evidence that the Act was not intended to en-
compass private discrimination:
[The bill's] whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that
whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws
shall be for and upon all citizens alike ....
... The bill does not reach mere private wrongs, but only those done under
color of State authority .... This is the whole of it.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293-94 (1866) (emphasis added).
89. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The issue in Johnson was "whether the timely filing of a
charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), pursuant to § 706 of Title VII... tolls the running of the period of limita-
tion applicable to an action, based on the same facts, instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."
Id. at 455.
90. Id. at 462-63.
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tain circumstances, punitive damages.91
Justice Blackmun concluded that portion of the opinion by
stating: "[T]he remedies available under Title VII and under §
1981, although related, and although directed to most of the
same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent. '92
4. Racial Discrimination and Private Education: Runyon
v. McCrary
In 1976, the Court gave full effect to section 1981 in a case
involving the discriminatory admission practices of a private
school. In Runyon v. McCrary,9" the parents of two black chil-
dren brought a section 1981 action against the private school
that had denied the children admission solely because of their
race." The Court held that section 1981 prohibits private, com-
mercially operated, non-sectarian schools from denying admis-
sion to prospective students because they are black.9e The Court
relied on its previous holdings in Jones" and Johnson97 to sup-
port its holding, finding that sections 1981 and 1982 were both
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Court adhered to
the Jones Court's interpretation of the legislative history regard-
ing the Act's application to "all racial discrimination, whether or
not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated
therein . . .,,"
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens expressed doubt
91. Id. at 459-60.
92. Id. at 461. See supra note 10.
93. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
94. Id. at 163-67.
95. Id. at 168-75. Justice Stewart began the majority opinion by delimiting the reach
of the Court's decision:
It is worth noting at the outset some of the questions that these cases do not
present. They do not present any question of the right of a private social organiza-
tion to limit its membership on racial or any other grounds. They do not present
any question of the right of a private school to limit its student body to boys, to
girls, or to adherents of a particular religious faith, since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is in no
way addressed to such categories of selectivity. They do not even present the ap-
plication of § 1981 to private sectarian schools that practice racial exclusion on
religious grounds.
Id. at 167 (emphasis in original).
96. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
97. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
98. Id. at 170 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968)).
[Vol. 11:411
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/6
EQUALITY OF EFFECT
about the interpretation reached by the Jones Court as to
whether the 39th Congress intended that the Civil Rights Act be
applied to private discrimination." Nonetheless, he agreed with
the majority because "even if Jones did not accurately reflect
the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords
with the prevailing sense of justice today."' 00
Justice White was joined by Justice Rehnquist in his dis-
sent.101 Justice White raised two principal objections to the ma-
jority's holding. First, he stated that, while section 1981 guaran-
tees blacks the same right to enter into and enforce contracts
that whites have, white persons have never had the right to
"contract with an unwilling private person, no matter what that
person's motivation for refusing to contract." 102 Second, Justice
White argued that § 1981 is derived not from the thirteenth
amendment, but from the fourteenth amendment, and therefore,
no claim can arise in the absence of state action. 10 3
5. Looking Beyond the Equal Right to Act
In two important cases in which it has interpreted the prog-
eny of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, sections 1981 and 1982, the
Supreme Court has looked beyond the guarantee of a right to
act and has held that these statutes protect not only the discrete
act - the act of purchasing property, for example - but that
they also guarantee that the effects of the act will not be af-
99. 427 U.S. at 189-90. Justice Stevens stated: "There is no doubt in my mind that
[the] construction of the statute [by the Jones Court] would have amazed the legislators
who voted for it." Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens was not yet a member of
the Court when Jones was decided.
100. Id. at 191.
101. Id. at 192.
102. Id. at 194. Justice White continued:
What is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is the right - which was enjoyed by
whites - "to make contracts" with other willing parties and to "enforce" those
contracts in court. Section 1981 would thus invalidate any state statute or court-
made rule of law which would have the effect of disabling Negroes or any other
class of persons from making contracts or enforcing contractual obligations or oth-
erwise giving less weight to their obligations than is given to contractual obliga-
tions running to whites. The statute by its terms does not require any private
individual or institution to enter into a contract or perform any other act under
any circumstances ....
Id. at 194.
103. Id. at 204-11. See supra note 60.
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fected by the actors' race.
In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association,'"
the Court held that section 1982 prohibited a neighborhood as-
sociation from denying the plaintiff and his family access to its
swimming pool because of their race. In Tillman, a community
had formed a neighborhood association to operate a swimming
pool; 105 membership was limited to 325 families from the sur-
rounding neighborhood. 106 Membership in the association was
not transferred incident to the purchase of a home; rather,
neighbors applied and were admitted on a first-come first-served
basis until the limit of 325 families was reached.10 7 Nonetheless,
the Court held that the right of blacks to buy homes in the
neighborhood was "abridged and diluted" when the neighbor-
hood association denied them the same membership opportuni-
ties that it granted white property owners. 08
In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,'09 the Court again
looked beyond the discrete act of purchasing property to hold
104. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
105. Id. at 432.
106. Id. at 433. The limit had been reached only once, and membership was not full
when plaintiff applied. Id.
107. The Court described the requirements and procedures for membership:
Membership is largely keyed to the geographical area within a three-quarter-mile
radius of the pool. A resident (whether or not a homeowner) of that area requires
no recommendation before he may apply for membership; the resident receives a
preferential place on the waiting list if he applies when the membership is full;
and the resident-member who is a homeowner and who sells his home and turns in
his membership, confers on the purchaser of his property a first option on the
vacancy created by his removal and resignation.... Only members and their
guests are admitted to the pool. No one else may gain admission merely by pay-
ment of an entrance fee.
Id. at 433 (emphasis added). Had pool membership been transferred with the purchase
of property, the plaintiff could easily have maintained that he had not been allowed to
purchase property as others could and that the sole reason for the inequality was his
race. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In Sullivan, Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc., which operated a community park and playground facility for the benefit
of residents, refused to approve Sullivan's assignment of membership to Freeman, a
black. The Court held that this violated 42 U.S.C. §1982. The Court rejected the Virginia
trial court's conclusion that Little Hunting Park was a private social club since there was
no plan or purpose of exclusiveness and it was open to every white in the area. The
Court labeled the refusal as a "devise functionally comparable to a racially restrictive
covenant, the judicial enforcement of which was struck down in Shelley v. Kramer.. .
Id. at 236.
108. 410 U.S. at 437.
109. 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
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that section 1982 also guaranteed the purchaser that the effect
of his purchase - the acquisition of the right to the quiet en-
joyment of his property - may not be abridged because of his
race. In Shaare, a Jewish congregation brought a section 1982
action against the defendant, alleging that his spray-painting of
anti-semitic slogans on its synagogue walls violated the civil
rights statute.110 The Court agreed, holding that the alleged act
was a racially discriminatory interference with the plaintiffs'
property rights. Shaare and Tillman are significant because, in
both, the Court found that plaintiffs' rights regarding the
purchase of property had been abridged by conduct that oc-
curred after they had purchased their property.'1
If racially discriminatory interference with property
rights - even when it occurs after the sale or lease of the prop-
erty - is an abridgment of the rights guaranteed by section
1982, it would seem to follow that racially discriminatory inter-
ference with an employment contract would give rise to a viola-
tion of the equal right to contract guaranteed by section 1981.
The Patterson Court did not agree.
III. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
A. The Facts
The petitioner, Brenda Patterson, a black woman, was em-
ployed by the respondent, McLean Credit Union," 2 as an ac-
counting clerk"" from May 5, 1972, until July 19, 1982."" Her
110. Id. at 616. The Court also held that Jews and Arabs were among people consid-
ered to be distinct races at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted. Id. at 616-
17.
111. Id. at 616.
112. The respondent is a credit union "chartered by the State of'North Carolina
making loans and accepting deposits solely from a defined field of members. At all times
relevant to this cause of action, the field of membership for McLean Credit Union was
limited to the employees of McLean Trucking Company." Brief for Respondent at 1,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107) [hereinafter Brief
for Respondent].
113. There is a dispute between the parties as to Patterson's title. Patterson main-
tains that she was hired as an "Accounting Clerk." Brief for Petitioner at 5, Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107) [hereinafter Brief for Peti-
tioner]. McLean avers that Patterson was hired as an "Accounting Clerk" only to con-
form to a hiring classification used by McLean Trucking Company, but that she was, in
fact, merely a "File Coordinator or Filing Clerk." Brief for Respondent, supra note 112,
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duties included filing, though she sometimes served as a backup
teller.115 On July 19, 1982, Patterson was laid off,"' and her em-
ployment was terminated after six months without recall.
1
"
Patterson alleged that during her tenure with McLean
Credit Union she was subjected to "abusive and demeaning
terms and conditions of employment""" in the form of persis-
tent harassment directed toward her solely because of her
race."" Among her claims,120 Patterson alleged that she was re-
quired to dust and sweep the office, though her white co-workers
were not required to do so;121 that her supervisor frequently
stood by her desk and stared at her; 122 that when she com-
at 2.
Because McLean Trucking Company performed the payroll functions for the Credit
Union as an accommodation to Respondent, Mrs. Patterson's job classification was listed
as "Accounting Clerk" on her original rating classification card in order to be consist-
ently reflected under the McLean Trucking Company job classifications. Id.
The distinction is important to Patterson's claim that a white employee, Susan
Howard Williamson, was promoted to the position of "Accountant Clerk Intermediate"
ahead of her because of his race. Brief for Petitioner at 11. See infra note 123 and ac-
companying text. McLean claims that the white employee, also initially hired as an "Ac-
counting Clerk," was just that; and thus the white employee was promoted to a position
for which Patterson was not qualified. Brief for Respondent, supra note 112, at 2. "Con-
trary to her contentions, Petitioner was not qualified for nor did she have the experience,
aptitude or qualifications to perform the accounting job." Brief for Respondent, supra
note 112, at 3.
114. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 3-4.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Two white employees were also laid off at that time. Brief for Respondent,
supra note 112, at 2.
117. Id.
118. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 5.
119. Id.
120. Patterson also alleged that during her preemployment interview her supervisor
had informed her that she "was going to be working with all white women ... and that
probably they wouldn't like [her] because they weren't used to working with blacks." Id.
She maintained further that she "was constantly scrutinized and criticized in a manner
not practiced with respect to the white office workers," id. at 6; that when she made an
error, she was "singled out and criticized by name in group staff meetings," whereas
white employees were "counselled in private" for their mistakes, id.; that her workload
was oppressive and in excess of that of her white co-workers, id. at 6-7; that "she was
required to help white clerical workers with their tasks, but [that] no one was ever as-
signed to help Patterson," id. at 7; that "[e]ven when her immediate supervisor [had]...
determined that Patterson had too much work to do, [another supervisor] continued to
add tasks," id.; and that she "was never given the opportunity to apply for or transfer to
the accountant junior position." Id. at 11.
121. Id. at 5-6.
122. Id. at 6.
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plained of a heavy workload, her supervisor had responded:
"[W]ell, blacks are known to work slower than whites by na-
ture."12 Patterson further alleged that white workers, with less
experience and education, were hired or promoted to positions
superior to hers.12"
Despite receiving a favorable annual evaluation during the
last year of her employment, 1 5 Patterson was denied a merit in-
crease in her salary 26 that was given to other employees (both
black and white),2 7 and she was subsequently laid off and ulti-
mately terminated.1 2 8
Patterson first pursued the administrative remedies availa-
ble under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.129 On June
30, 1983, Patterson received a "Notice of a Right to Sue,"
though she did not then or later file a claim under Title VII for
123. Id. at 7. These remarks were allegedly made by Robert Stevenson, who served
as President and General Manager of the Credit Union. Id. at 4. At trial, another of
Patterson's supervisors, Warren Behling, testified that he had once recommended a
black applicant for the position of computer operator. After interviewing the applicant,
Stevenson telephoned Behling and asked: "[W]hy the hell didn't you tell me this person
was black?" Id. at 8. According to Behling, Stevenson concluded: "We will interview this
person but we will not hire him and we will search for additional people who are not
black." Id. McLean, however, in challenging the veracity of Behling's testimony, noted
that Behllng had been terminated from the company for poor job performance. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 112, at 3 n.3.
In the thirty-two years that Stevenson worked there, only three black workers were
employed by McLean. All three of these black workers had been given filing jobs. Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 9.
124. Id. at 10.
125. "Patterson's annual evaluation . .. indicated that Patterson's attitude was
above average, and included the comment 'Actually Goes Out [of her] Way To Be Pleas-
ant With Everyone.'" Id. at 12 (original brackets).
126. Id.
127. Brief for Respondent, supra note 112, at 7.
128. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 12.
129. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any. individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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racial harassment or disparate treatment.'" The statute of limi-
tations on any possible Title VII claim that she might have
brought against the respondent expired in July 1984.181
B. The Lower Court Decisions
1. The District Court Decision
On January 25, 1984, Patterson filed a section 1981 action
against McLean Credit Union in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.8 2 Patterson
based her action on two theories of liability under section
1981.13 First, she maintained that the Credit Union was liable
to her for subjecting her to racial harassment in the forms of
racial slurs, excessive work, and the denial of a merit increase in
her salary.184 Second, she asserted that the Credit Union was lia-
ble to her for basing its decisions not to promote her, and, sub-
sequently, to terminate her employment, solely on the basis of
her race. " 5 In addition to her section 1981 claims, Patterson
brought a pendent state claim for intentional infliction of mental
and emotional distress.3 6
After a six day jury trial, the district court ruled that racial
harassment was not cognizable under section 1981, and, there-
fore, dismissed that part of Patterson's claim.1 87 The court did
submit to the jury Patterson's section 1981 claim for discrimina-
tory failure to promote and discriminatory discharge.138 How-
ever, the district court instructed the jury that in order to pre-
vail on her promotion discrimination claim, Patterson had to
show that she was more qualified than the person who was pro-
moted in her stead.13 9 Finally, the district court applied North
130. Brief for Respondent, supra note 112, at 7.
131. Under Title VII, the statute of limitations is 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(1982).
132. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 13 (no published district court opinion).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145-47 (4th Cir. 1986),
afl'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1147. The district court instructed the jury:
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Carolina case law applicable to Patterson's pendent claim and
concluded that her supervisor's alleged treatment of her did not
rise to the level of outrageousness required for a finding of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, and the court directed
a verdict for McLean on this claim. 140
With only the discriminatory-failure-to-promote claim
before it, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.14 1
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
Patterson raised two principal issues in her appeal to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals."4 First, she questioned the dis-
trict court's holding that racial harassment was not cognizable
under section 1981; and, second, its holding in order for an em-
ployee to prevail on a promotion discrimination claim, whether
it was necessary to show that she was more qualified than the
employee promoted in her stead. 14
The court of appeals affirmed all parts of the district court's
decision.'4 The court held that section 1981 did not prohibit an
employer from subjecting his employee to racial harassment, but
rather prohibited only discrimination in hiring, firing, and pro-
motion, matters that "go to the very existence and nature of the
employment contract.""45 Racial harassment by an employer
may evidence discriminatory intent necessary to show, for exam-
In order to carry her burden on [the promotion claim], the plaintiff must establish
(1) that a promotion was in fact given to Susan Howard Williamson; (2) that the
plaintiff had expressed an interest in the promotion, plaintiff may satisfy this re-
quirement by showing that she had expressed a general interest in advancing as
opportunities arose within the credit union; and (3) that plaintiff was better qual-
ified for the position received by Susan Howard Williamson than was Susan
Howard Williamson; and (4) that plaintiff was denied the promotion because of
her race.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 15 n.4.
140. 805 F.2d at 1145.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1143.
143. Id. at 1145, 1147. Two additional issues were raised by Patterson on appeal.
The first concerned her pendent state claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Patterson also appealed the district
court's decision to exclude the testimony of two witnesses. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's rulings, and neither of these issues were raised on appeal to the Su-
preme Court. 805 F.2d at 1144.
144. 805 F.2d at 1145.
145. Id. at 1145-46.
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pie, an unlawful failure to hire or promote.4 6 However, racial
harassment does not by itself abridge the right to "make" and
"enforce" contracts conferred by section 1981.'11
The court of appeals also held that the lower court did not
err when it instructed the jury that, in order for her to prevail
on her promotion discrimination claim, Patterson had to show
that she was more qualified than the employee promoted in her
place. 48 The court applied the disparate treatment proof analy-
sis " 9 developed for Title VII actions in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.50 Under McDonnell Douglas, once an employer
has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for favoring another
employee over the claimant, the burden of persuasion shifts
back to the claimant to show that this reason is pretextual and
that the claimant was denied advancement because of racial dis-
crimination. 51 According to both the district court and the court
of appeals, the only way to show discriminatory intent of the
employer is to prove that the claimant was better qualified than
the person who was in fact promoted or hired. 52
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The two issues raised by .Patterson on appeal to the Su-
preme Court were, first, whether section 1981 encompassed a
claim of racial discrimination in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment; " and second, whether the district court had erred
when it instructed the jury that, in order for her to prevail on
her claim of discrimination in promotion, Patterson had to prove
that she was more qualified than the white employee who was
promoted in her place.'5
These were the only issues raised by the parties. The re-
spondent, McLean Credit Union, argued that the lower courts
146. Id. at 1145.
147. Id. at 1146.
148. Id. at 1147.
149. Id.
150. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
151. 805 F.2d at 1147.
152. Id.
153. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit at ii, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
154. Id.
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were correct in their decisions; McLean did not challenge Pat-
terson's use of section 1981 on the grounds that section 1981
could not apply to the wholly private employment contract be-
tween it and Patterson. " In other words, McLean did not ask
the Court to overturn Runyon.
Nonetheless, after hearing argument,166 the Court issued an
order for reargument on April 28, 1988, asking the parties to
brief and argue an additional question: "Whether or not the in-
terpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in Run-
yon v. McCrary ... should be reconsidered? '157
1. The Order for Reargument
The Court's sua sponte order for reargument sent shock
waves through the civil rights community. 155 The per curiam or-
der itself is a defensive document written entirely in response to
the arguments made by the four dissenting justices.15 9 The two-
page order sets forth four principles that explain the majority's
decision to request reargument.1 60
First, the Court argued that "[i]t is surely no affront to set-
tled jurisprudence to request argument on whether a particular
precedent should be modified or overruled,"161 and it proceeded
to list five cases in which it had ordered reargument. e2 Second,
citing additional cases, the Court argued that it had overruled
155. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 112.
156. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (order for reargument),
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
157. Id. (citation omitted).
158. In the year that followed, no fewer than three law schools (Yale, Michigan, and
Washington University) sponsored symposiums in which the issues surrounding the pos-
sible reversal of Runyon were presented. See supra note 16.
159. The per curiam opinion begins: "One might think from the dissents of our col-
leagues from the above order that our decision to hear argument as to whether the deci-
sion in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsidered is a 'first' in the
history of the Court." Patterson, 485 U.S. at 617.
160. Id. at 617-19.
161. Id. at 617.
162. The Court cited: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 468
U.S. 1213 (1984) (ordering reargument), 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (decision); Illinois v. Gates,
459 U.S. 1028 (1982) (ordering reargument), 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (decision); Alfred Dun-
hill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975) (ordering reargument), 425
U.S. 682 (1976) (decision); Benton v. Maryland, 393 U.S. 994 (1968) (ordering reargu-
ment), 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (decision). 485 U.S. at 617-18.
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statutory precedents "in a host of cases."16 Third, the Court
noted the importance of stare decisis, but recognized it as "'a
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula.' "" Finally,
the majority argued that civil rights cases such as Runyon are
not to be accorded special treatment but are subject to the same
principles of stare decisis and review as other decisions. 16 5
The order for reargument contained two dissenting opin-
ions. In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens, Justice Blackmun argued that the Court's order for reargu-
ment was inconsistent with the principle of stare decisis because
there was no possibility that overturning Runyon would "'bring
[the Court's] opinions into agreement with experience and with
facts newly ascertained.' ,,166 He further stated that Congress has
had opportunities to reject the Court's interpretation of Runyon
and that it specifically chose not to do so. 167 In his dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, argued that the Court's "spontaneous decision" to
reconsider its holding in Runyon "is certain to engender wide-
spread concern in those segments of our population that must
rely on a federal rule of law as a protection against invidious
private discrimination."I" He also criticized the majority for
raising an issue that had been raised by neither party nor by the
Solicitor General, thereby damaging the "public perception of
the Court as an impartial adjudicator of cases and controversies
brought to us for decision by lawyers representing adverse inter-
ests in contested litigation." 16 9
Patterson was reargued on October 12, 1988.170
163. 485 U.S. at 618.
164. Id. at 618-19 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (Frank-
furter, J.)).
165. The Court noted:
We do not believe that the Court may recognize any such exception to the abiding
rule that it treat all litigants equally: that is, that the claim of any litigant for the
application of a rule to its case should not be influenced by the Court's view of the
worthiness of the litigant in terms of extralegal criteria.
485 U.S. at 619.
166. Id. at 619 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412
(1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
167. 485 U.S. at 620. See infra note 188.
168. 485 U.S. at 620.
169. Id. at 622.
170. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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2. The Majority Opinion
Though the Court had by its "spontaneous" order for rear-
gument raised the specter of a severe restriction on an important
civil rights remedy, it ultimately declined to overrule Runyon.
The Court, however, affirmed the lower courts' decisions denying
Patterson the use of section 1981 in her racial harassment
claim.17 1 Finally, the Court held that the district court had erred
in its instruction to the jury that Patterson had to prove she was
better qualified than the white employee who was promoted in
her place. 172
The Court's decision not to overturn Runyon was grounded
firmly in the principles of stare decisis.1 73 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Kennedy intimated that Runyon may have been
wrongly decided,1 74 but even if it was, it was not so wrong as to
warrant overturning the holding in that case.1 7 5 Justice Kennedy
identified three sets of circumstances in which overturning of
precedent would be justified,1 76 none of which were present in
Patterson.
Next, the Court held that racial harassment in the course of
171. Id. at 2372-77.
172. Id. at 2377-79.
173. Id. at 2368-72.
174. Id. at 2370. Justice Kennedy noted:
The arguments about whether Runyon was decided correctly in light of the lan-
guage and history of the statute were examined and discussed with great care in
[Runyon]. It was recognized at the time that a strong case could be made for the
view that the statute does not reach private conduct, but that view did not pre-
vail. Some members of this Court believe that Runyon was decided incorrectly,
and others consider it correct on its own footing, but the question before us is
whether it ought now to be overturned.
Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 2370. "We conclude, upon direct consideration of the issue, that no spe-
cial justification has been shown for overruling Runyon." Id.
176. Id. at 2370-71. Those circumstances include: (1) "the intervening development
of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Con-
gress," id. at 2370; (2) situations in which a precedent becomes a "positive detriment to
coherence and consistency in the law, either because of inherent confusion created by an
unworkable decision, or because the decision poses a direct obstacle to the realization of
important objectives embodied in other laws," id. at 2371 (citations omitted); (3) situa-
tions in which "a precedent becomes more vulnerable as it becomes outdated and after
being 'tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or
with the social welfare,'" id. (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring),
quoting B. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICILi PROCESS 149 (1921)).
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employment is not actionable under section 1981, because such
conduct does not impair the employee's right to make or enforce
a contract.1 7 Racial harassment, as such, occurs after the con-
tract - here an employment contract - is formed, and does
not affect the employee's ability to enforce by legal means his or
her contract rights.1 8
The Court rejected Patterson's argument that section 1981
proscribes discrimination with regards to terms and conditions
of employment.1"' Such an interpretation, it held, would not
only be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute re-
garding the "making" and "enforcing" of contracts,180 but would
also render the "elaborate" dispute resolution procedures of Ti-
tle VII superfluous.181 With respect to the issue of whether a dis-
criminatory failure to promote would give rise to a section 1981
violation, the Court held that only a promotion that creates a
"new and distinct relationship" between employer and employee
is protected by the civil rights statute.182 Finally, the Court ar-
177. Id. at 2372-77. The Court held:
The statute prohibits, when based on race, the refusal to enter into a contract
with someone, as well as the offer to make a contract only on discriminatory
terms. But the right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic
or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been es-
tablished .... Such postformation conduct does not involve the right to make a
contract, but rather implicates the performance of established contract obligations
and the conditions of continuing employment, matters more naturally governed by
state contract law and Title VII.
Id. at 2372-73.
178. Id. at 2373.
179. Id. at 2374.
180. Id.
181. The Court held:
Interpreting § 1981 to cover postformation conduct unrelated to an em-
ployee's right to enforce her contract, such as incidents relating to the conditions
of employment, is not only inconsistent with that statute's limitation . . . , but
would also undermine the detailed and well-crafted procedures for conciliation
and resolution of Title VII claims. In Title VII, Congress set up an elaborate ad-
ministrative procedure, implemented through the EEOC, that is designed to assist
in the investigation of claims of racial discrimination in the work place and to
work towards the resolution of these claims through conciliation rather than liti-
gation. Only after these procedures have been exhausted, and the plaintiff has
obtained a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC, may she bring a Title VII action
in court.
Id. at 2374-75 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 2377. The Court's failure to define what constitutes a "new and distinct
relationship" has lead to varying interpretations by lower courts since Patterson was
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gued that interpreting section 1981 to encompass racial harass-
ment claims would federalize claims for breach of contract, and
that the Court is "'reluctant to federalize' matters traditionally
covered by state common law"18s in the absence of a congres-
sional directive.
On the third and final issue facing the Court, the question
of the propriety of the district court's jury instructions on Pat-
terson's promotion claim, the Court reversed the lower court. It
held that Patterson could have shown discriminatory intent by
proving that she was better qualified than the white employee
promoted in her place, but that she was not required to do so.
The Court stated that she could have shown that her employer's
reasons were pretextual "by presenting evidence of respondent's
past treatment of [her], including the instances of racial harass-
ment which she alleges ...."18" Justice Kennedy concluded the
opinion by declaring the Court's commitment to affirming con-
gressional policies forbidding both public and private
discrimination. '"
3. The Dissent
Justices Brennan and Stevens each wrote dissenting opini
ions.186 Justice Brennan began his dissent by criticizing the
Court's decision to reconsider Runyon. s7 Next, he found fault
with the majority's reliance on stare decisis for not overturning
Runyon, arguing that two better reasons for refusing to overturn
the Court's interpretation of section 1981 are that Runyon was
correctly decided, and that, even if it had not been correctly de-
cided, Congress had specifically declined to overrule the Court's
holding in Runyon, although it has had the opportunity to do
SO.158
decided. See infra note 223.
183. Id. at 2376 (quoting Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 463, 479 (1977)).
184. 109 S. Ct. at 2378.
185. Id. at 2379. "Neither our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as sig-
naling one inch of retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private,
as well as the public, sphere." Id.
186. Id. at 2379. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall,
and was joined in part by Justice Stevens.
187. Id. at 2380.
188. Id. Justice Brennan cited the fate of an amendment to Title VII proposed dur-
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Turning next to the Court's holding that section 1981 did
not prohibit employment-related racial harassment, Brennan
criticized the Court for its narrow interpretation of section
1981's contract clause. 89 An interpretation of section 1981 that
encompassed Patterson's racial harassment claim would reflect
the intent of the authors of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.10 Bren-
nan cited the Schurz Report to demonstrate that the authors in-
tended the contract clause to apply to post-contractual
conduct.191
Brennan next argued that a plain reading of section 1981's
contract clause reveals that postformation conduct is covered by
the statute:1e2 if the right to contract conferred by section 1981
necessarily includes the right to contract on racially neutral
terms,1" then postformation conduct may be evidence that neu-
tral terms were absent and that, therefore, the contract right has
been abridged.194 Racial harassment, for example, by a white
employer against a black employee may reveal that the employer
had "imposed discriminatory terms" on their employment con-
tract at the time of formation, and that the parties had never
ing the enactment of the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972. Id. at 2386. Proposed by Sena-
tor Hruska, the amendment would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for private
acts of employment discrimination. Senator Williams opposed the Hruska amendment,
saying "that it was not the purpose of the bill 'to repeal existing civil rights laws,' and
that to do so 'would severely weaken our overall effort to combat the presence of employ-
ment discrimination.'" Id. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3371 (1972)). Williams argued that §
1981 should not be limited as Hruska proposed:
The right of individuals to bring suits in Federal courts to redress individual
acts of discrimination, including employment discrimination[,] was first provided
by the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §s 1981, 1983. It was recently
stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Mayer, that these acts pro-
vide fundamental constitutional guarantees. In any case, the courts have specifi-
cally held that Title VII and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 are not mutu-
ally exclusive and must be read together to provide alternative means to redress
individual grievances.
Id.
189. 109 S. Ct. at 2386.
190. Id. at 2388.
191. Id. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schurz
Report.
192. 109 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
193. And the majority agrees that it does. See supra note 177 and accompanying
text.
194. 109 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
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been on equal terms.195
According to Brennan, employment-related racial harass-
ment may demonstrate that the black employee was not allowed
to make a contract on an equal basis as a white employee, and
thus did not have the same right "to make and enforce contracts
.. as is enjoyed by white citizens."1 6 Brennan recognized that
the language of the contract clause did place some limits on the
"type of harassment claims that are cognizable under section
1981."197 He argued that the claimant must show that "the acts
constituting harassment were sufficiently severe or pervasive as
effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered into
in a racially neutral manner."'' Thus, not all racial harassment
is actionable under section 1981. An isolated instance of a white
employee directing racial slurs toward a black co-worker, for ex-
ample, might not be "sufficiently severe" as to give rise to a
claim against an employer.
Finally, Brennan dismissed the Court's argument that Pat-
terson's interpretation of section 1981 undermines Title VII.'"
He argued that Congress had specifically rejected an amendment
to Title VII that would have denied victims of employment dis-
crimination the use of section 1981.200
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the distinction the
Court attempted to make between pre- and post-formation dis-
criminatory conduct.2 0 He wrote that he failed to understand
the distinction between the employer who openly discriminates
at the contract formation stage, 02 and the employer who waits
to reveal his discriminatory intent until after the contract is
made,0 3 or the distinction between the employer who enters
195. Id. at 2389.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
197. 109 S. Ct. at 2389.
198. Id. at 2389 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 2390.
200. Id. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
201. 109 S. Ct. at 2395.
202. By, for example, requiring a black employee to work in conditions that are
worse than those worked in by white employees.
203. Id. at 2396:
[I]t is difficult to discern why an employer who makes his intentions known has
discriminated in the "making" of a contract, while the employer who conceals his
discriminatory intent until after the applicant has accepted the job, only later to
reveal that black employees are intentionally harassed and insulted, has not.
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into the contract without discriminatory intent, but who subse-
quently decides to discriminate against his black employee.204 In
each case the employer is guilty of discriminating in the "mak-
ing" of a contract.0 5 Stevens predicated his conclusion upon a
dynamic interpretation of the term "contract":
A contract is not just a piece of paper. Just as a single word is the
skin of a living thought, so is a contract evidence of a vital, ongo-
ing relationship between human beings. An at-will employee, such
as petitioner, is not merely performing an existing contract; she is
constantly remaking that contract. Whenever significant new du-
ties are assigned to the employee - whether they better or
worsen the relationship - the contract is amended and a new
contract is made. Thus, if after the employment relationship is
formed, the employer deliberately implements a policy of harass-
ment of black employees, he has imposed a contractual term on
them that is not the "same" as the contractual provisions that are
"enjoyed by white citizens."2 6
To support his assertion that deliberate racial harassment
of employees is discrimination in the making of a contract, he
concluded by noting, "I cannot believe that the decision in
[Runyon] would have been different if the school had agreed to
allow the black students to attend, but subjected them to segre-
gated classes and other racial abuse. '10 7
IV. Analysis
By excluding racial harassment from the scope of conduct
that section 1981 protects on the grounds that postformation
conduct does not abridge the right to contract, the Court denied
Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. Justice Stevens continued:
Moreover, whether employed at-will or for a fixed term, employees typically strive
to achieve a more rewarding relationship with their employers. By requiring black
employees to work in a hostile environment, the employer has denied them the
same opportunity for advancement that is available to white citizens. A deliberate
policy of harassment of black employees who are competing with white citizens is,
I submit, manifest discrimination in the making of contracts in the sense in which
that concept was interpreted in Runyon v. McCrary.
Id. (citation omitted).
207. Id.
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Patterson the right to contract on racially neutral terms. The
Court departed from precedent established in similar civil rights
cases, notably section 1982 actions, 08 in which the Court recog-
nized that the equal right to act includes the right to have that
act end in an equal effect. In those cases, the Court looked be-
yond the right to act explicitly stated in the statutes to examine
whether the effects of those acts were equal; if they were not
equal, there was no equality between the acts themselves. The
Patterson Court, however, denied the plaintiff the equality of
effect that necessarily accompanies every right. Without equality
of effect, the protected act alone becomes a charade.
A. Equality Of Right Embodies Equality Of Effect
Without a guarantee of equal effect or result, the equal right
to act is meaningless. Thus, for example, we understand the
meaning of the phrase "the equal right to vote" to include a
guarantee that our access to the polls is the same as that of an-
other person, that our vote counts - that is, it has an ef-
fect - and that it counts for no more or no less than another
person's vote. Equality of right, therefore, clearly extends be-
yond the discrete act. Equality of right encompasses both the
act and the effect.209
208. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
209. To further illustrate, it may be helpful to distinguish the separate principles
which comprise an "equal right":
1. The Right To Act Guarantees The Right To Effect.
Any guarantee of a right to act necessarily guarantees that the act, if properly exe-
cuted, will have the result intended by the actor. A guarantee of a right to vote, for
example, also guarantees that the vote, when properly cast, will be added to the total
number of votes cast.
If the intended result is not achieved by the actor who properly exercises her right
to act, that right has been abridged. If a vote is properly cast but not added to the total
number of votes, either by design or by mistake, then the right to vote has been
abridged.
2. The Equal Right To Act Guarantees The Equal Right To Effect.
A guarantee of an equal right to act is a guarantee that one person has the same
opportunity to act as another person, and therefore has the same right to cause an effect
as another person. For example, an equal right to vote guarantees one person the same
right to have her vote added to the total as another person.
If the equal right to act is guaranteed, but the equal right to cause an effect is not,
then the equal right to act is abridged. If, for example, all adults enjoy an equal right to
vote, but one adult's properly cast vote is not added to the total number of votes, that
adult's equal right to vote has been abridged.
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B. Determining Equal Effect: A Framework for Analysis
Determining whether there is equality of effect requires a
three-pronged analysis: first, the effects of similar acts must be
determined; second, it must be determined whether the effects
of two similar acts are equal; and, third, if they are not equal,
the cause of inequality must be determined. If the cause of ine-
quality of effect between two similar acts is prohibited - if the
cause is related to racial discrimination, for example - then
the court will find that the equal right protected by the statute
has been abridged.
Thus, the court must first identify the effects of an act. 10
An effect of pulling the lever in a voting booth might be simply
the addition of a vote to the total number of votes cast; an effect
of casting that vote might also be the election of a particular
candidate. An effect of purchasing a home might be the acquisi-
tion of a right to the quiet enjoyment of the property; another
effect of that same purchase might also include an opportunity
for the homeowner to run for a seat on the town council. Simi-
larly, an effect of entering into an employment contract might
include the acquisition of a right to be free of certain types of
harassment; another effect might be the receipt of promotions
and pay raises.
Second, the court must determine whether the effects of two
similar acts are equal."11 Inequality of effect exists if, for exam-
3. The Equal Right To Act Guarantees The Right To Equal Effect.
The guarantee of an equal right to act guarantees that the effect of the properly
executed act will be the same for all. The equal right to vote, therefore, guarantees that
the effect of the act of voting by one person - one vote added to the total - will be
equal to the effect of the act of voting by another person - also one vote added to the
total.
If the effect of one person's act is not equal to the effect of another person's act,
then, assuming proper and equal execution, the first person's equal right to act has been
abridged. For example, if one person's vote adds one unit to the total votes cast, but
another person's vote counts for only one half of a unit, then the latter's equal right to
vote has been abridged to the extent that the effect of his act is not equal to the effect of
the other person's act.
To summarize, the equal right to act necessarily guarantees that equal acts will end
in equal results. If equal effort does not result in equal effect, the equal right to act has
been abridged. Without equal effect there is no equal right.
210. Obviously, every act may be the cause of an infinite number of effects. The
court would consider only those effects that might indicate impermissible conduct.
211. The way to determine whether the effects of like acts are equal is to compare
[Vol. 11:411
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/6
EQUALITY OF EFFECT
ple, one homeowner acquires the right to become a member of
an organization, but his neighbor does not.
The most important prong in the equal effects analysis is
the third: the court must determine, if there are unequal effects
resulting from similar acts, whether the cause of the inequality
is prohibited. Of course, the great majority of unequal effects
that result from similar acts are not prohibited. For example, in
an election where two voters vote for two different candidates
and one of those two candidates wins, the effect of each vote is
not equal. But no law guarantees the right of a person to choose
the elected official; only the right to participate equally in the
selection process is guaranteed. Likewise, in an employment set-
ting, if two people enter into an employment contract, and one
advances rapidly and the other does not, the act of contracting
has led to unequal effects. But the right to advance at the same
pace as another is not guaranteed by the law. Only the right not
to be denied advancement on the basis of a few enumerated per-
sonal characteristics, such as race, religion, national origin, age,
and, in some states, marital status, is protected. By applying this
three-pronged analysis to cases in which the plaintiff makes) a
claim of inequality of effect, courts will be able to determine
whether the defendant has violated the protected right to act by
denying the plaintiff equality of effect.
C. The Court's Recognition of The Equal Effects Principle
The Supreme Court has recognized that there can be no
equality of right without equality of effect. It has done so both
explicitly and implicitly in cases involving the progeny of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, sections 1981 and 1982.
In Tilman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association,12 a
them, and this can be done only by examining the facts that have occurred after the act
took place. For example, the intended effect of casting a ballot is not realized when a
lever is pulled, but only when that vote is added to the total number of votes cast, and
when that total, in turn, becomes a factor in the outcome of the election. Therefore,
determining whether the effect of one person's vote is equal to the effect of another's
vote would require tracing each vote to its intended effect. In other words, the only way
to determine whether there is equality of effect is to examine events occurring after the
act is executed; if the protected act is the right to contract, this means examining the
postformation conduct of the parties.
212. 410 U.S. 431 (1973). See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
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neighborhood pool association denied membership to a black
family who, except for their race, met all the requirements for
membership. Pool membership was not transferred incident to
the purchase of property. Had it been, the plaintiff could easily
have argued that his right to purchase property had been
abridged initially where, because of his race, he was not permit-
ted to purchase property as others could.2 18 That is, his right to
purchase would have been abridged at the pre-purchase stage.
What makes the Tillman decision remarkable is that the
Court looked beyond the discrete act of purchasing property to
determine what the effects of that act were. In the plaintiff's
neighborhood, for a white person the effect of purchasing a
house was that he received the opportunity to become a member
of the swimming pool association. However, for the black home-
owner, the effect of purchasing the same home did not include
that opportunity.
By holding that the right of blacks to buy homes in the
neighborhood was "abridged and diluted" by the pool associa-
tion's denial of membership, the Court found, in essence, that,
because the cause of the unequal effect was racial discrimina-
tion, there was an abridgement of the right to purchase prop-
erty, a right protected by section 1982.
Justice Kennedy's assertion in Patterson, that section 1981
"extends only to the formation of the contract" and that it does
not include postformation conduct, is impossible to square with
the Court's holding in Tillman. Like section 1981, section 1982
speaks only of the right to act; it provides only that all citizens
have the same right to purchase property as do white persons.214
Section 1982 says nothing about guaranteeing all property own-
ers equal benefits and privileges of their property.2 5 Nonethe-
less, the Court correctly looked beyond the guarantee of equality
of opportunity and examined the effects of the purchase of a
home by a white and by a black in the same neighborhood, and
concluded that the effects of exercising that right by each were
not equal, and that the cause of the inequality was prohibited by
213. See supra note 107.
214. See supra note 14.
215. Id.
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section 1982.216
The Supreme Court again examined equality of effect in an-
other section 1982 case, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb.21 7
In Shaare, the Court held that persons who spray painted anti-
semitic slogans on the outside of a synagogue were liable to the
synagogue's owners under section 1982.218 The Court held that
the defendant's actions constituted a "racially discriminatory in-
terference with property rights.' 1 9 Once again, there was no ob-
struction of an opportunity to purchase or lease property; rather,
the Court looked beyond the right to purchase property that is
explicitly guaranteed by section 1982 and recognized that one
effect of purchasing property is the acquisition by "white" prop-
erty owners of an uninterrupted right to the quiet enjoyment of
their property. In Shaare, because of the plaintiff's "race" and
the defendant's anti-semitic acts, the effect of the property own-
ers' purchase did not include the acquisition of the uninter-
rupted quiet enjoyment of their property. Therefore, the effects
of two identical acts were not equal, and the sole reason for the
inequality was plaintiff's race. Because the defendants had
caused the inequality of effect, they were liable under section
1982.
By implication, the Runyon Court also recognized the ne-
cessity of equality of effect to the guarantee of equal rights. Al-
though Runyon involved equality of opportunity in the making
of a contract, and no explicit equality of effect issue was raised
as it was in Tillman and Shaare, it requires no leap of the imag-
ination to suspect that, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in
Patterson, the Court would not have permitted the private
school to admit black children only to let the school subject
them to racial discrimination.2 0 Assuming that Stevens is cor-
216. 410 U.S. at 437.
217. 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
218. Id. at 616.
219. Id. (citation omitted).
220. As Justice Stevens noted:
A deliberate policy of harassment of black employees who are competing with
white citizens is, I submit, manifest discrimination in the making of contracts in
the sense in which that concept was interpreted in Runyon v. McCrary .... I
cannot believe that the decision in that case would have been different if the
school had agreed to allow the black students to attend, but subjected them to
segregated classes and other racial abuse.
.19911
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rect, an effect of entering into a contract with a private school is
the creation of a right to have one's children educated in an en-
vironment free of racial animus. If this effect is realized by white
parents but not by black, then there is inequality of effect, and
the black parents' freedom to contract is abridged.
D. The Patterson Court Abandoned the Equal Effects
Principle
In Patterson, the Court failed to look beyond the guarantee
of equality of opportunity to act - the discrete act of entering
into an employment contract - and did not examine the effect
of Patterson's act to see whether she had been denied equality
of effect, and if so, whether the unequal effect had resulted in an
abridgment of the right to act guaranteed by section 1981.21 By
failing to guarantee the equal effect of her contract, the Court
failed to guarantee her the right to contract.
2 22
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2396 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2372. In a footnote to his dissent, Justice Brennan discussed inequality of
effect and the Court's decision in Shaare:
The Court's overly narrow reading of the language of § 1981 is difficult to
square with our interpretation of the equal right protected by § 1982 "to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property" not just as cov-
ering the rights to acquire and dispose of property, but also the "right ... to use
property on an equal basis with white citizens," and "not to have property inter-
ests impaired because of.. . race."
In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, we reversed the dismissal of a claim
by a Jewish congregation alleging that individuals were liable under § 1982 for
spraying racist graffiti on the walls of the congregation's synagogue. . . . [O]ur
opinion nowhere hints that the congregation's vandalism claim might not be cog-
nizable under the statute because it implicated the use of property, and not its
acquisition or disposal.
Id. at 2389 n.12 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
222. The Court's decision becomes still harder to understand when one considers
that Patterson's use of § 1981 was a relatively modest application of that statute when
compared with the way the Court applied § 1982 in Tillman and Shaare: Patterson used
§ 1981 against the other party to the contract; Tillman and Shaare used § 1982 against
third parties. Tillman and Shaare cannot maintain, as Brennan argued Patterson could,
that the defendants' conduct was evidence that the protected act was not carried out in
racially neutral terms. They could argue only that, solely because of their race, the effect
of their purchase was not the same as the effect obtained by other purchasers employing
the same means. If the Patterson Court had construed § 1981 as it did § 1982 in Shaare,
then, conceivably, a black employee assaulted because of his race by a co-worker could
bring a § 1981 action against the white co-worker for racially discriminatory interference
with plaintiff's employment rights.
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Had the Court applied the same analysis to the facts in Pat-
terson as it applied in Tillman and Shaare, it would have con-
cluded that racial harassment directed towards black but not
white employees is an abridgment prohibited by section 1981, of
the right to contract. First, the Patterson Court should have de-
termined whether one effect of entering into an employment
contract at the McLean Credit Union was the creation of a right
to work in an environment that was free of racial harassment.
Second, if this was the effect of the employment contract en-
tered into by her white co-workers, but not by Patterson, the
Court should have next applied the third prong of the analysis
by determining whether the reason for the unequal effect was
prohibited. The Court would have found that the cause of the
alleged unequal effect was based on Patterson's race and that
section 1981 prohibits any impairment based on race to the right
to contract. The Court would have concluded that the inequality
of effect between Patterson's contract and the contracts entered
into by her white co-workers resulted in an abridgment of Pat-
terson's protected right to contract.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union represents a compromise. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court raised the specter of reversing a landmark civil
rights case - Runyon v. Maryland - with its sua sponte or-
der for reargument on the issue of whether state action is neces-
sary to bring a section 1981 action; in the end, however, the
Court declined to overturn Runyon. On the other hand, the
Court departed from the analysis it had applied to section 1981's
sister statute, section 1982, and construed section 1981 to ex-
clude from its scope the effect of Patterson's employment con-
tract - enduring alleged racial harassment by her em-
ployer - thereby denying Patterson the equality of effect that
necessarily accompanies every protected right.
But the Court's decision was not the end of the tale.2 3 It
223. In several cases decided since Patterson, lower courts have been unable to ap-
ply the Patterson holdings uniformly. For example, district courts differ as to whether
the termination of employment based on racial grounds violates § 1981, a question not
directly addressed in the Supreme Court's decision. Compare Fowler v. McCrory Corp.,
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would appear that Justice Stevens' warning that the Supreme
Court's treatment of civil rights law would "engender wide-
spread concern in those segments of our population that must
rely on a federal rule of law as a protection against invidious
private discrimination" has come to pass.2 4 On February 5,
1990, Representative Paula Hawkins and Senator Edward Ken-
nedy introduced into Congress the Civil Rights Act of 1990, an
Act designed to reverse a series of recent decisions by the Su-
preme Court which have eroded civil rights protection.2 2 The
727 F.Supp. 228, 229-30 (D.Md. 1989) (former store manager who alleged that he was
constructively discharged as a consequence of refusal to implement racially-discrimina-
tory hiring policy brought action under § 1981; the court held that termination of em-
ployment did not in and of itself constitute a violation of § 1981) and Gersman v. Group
Health Ass'n, 725 F.Supp. 573, 575 (D.D.C. 1989) (termination of contract that was being
automatically renewed for one-month term as provided in original contract constituted
"postformation conduct" outside scope of civil rights statute giving equal right to make
and enforce contracts, even though contract permitted renegotiation of price for any one-
month term, and even if automatic renewals and opportunities to renegotiate price re-
sulted in new and distinct contracts) and Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721
F.Supp. 587, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (demotions or retaliatory discharges may not be ad-
dressed through § 1981 in that they do not interfere with the rights of black citizens to
make and enforce contracts) with Padilla v. United Airlines, 716 F.Supp. 485, 490
(D.Colo. 1989) (discriminatory termination of black employee directly affected her right
to make a contract and was actionable under § 1981). A second source of controversy in
the lower courts has been the question, when does a promotion create the "new and
distinct relationship" between employer and employee required to trigger § 1981? Krupa
v. New Castle County, 732 F.Supp. 497, 520 (D.Del. 1990) (promotion from patrolman to
sergeant would not have amounted to a new employment contract between police officer
and county within protection of § 1981); James v. International Business Machine Corp.,
737 F.Supp. 1420, 1426 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (promotion sought by black female employee
from nonmanagement position to management position would not have constituted a
"new and distinct relationship" with employer); White v. Federal Express Corp., 729
F.Supp. 1536, 1546 (E.D.Va. 1990) (change in employment status from courier to dis-
patcher was more in the nature of a lateral transfer than a promotion); but see Bennun
v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 737 F.Supp. 1393, 1397-98 (D.N.J. 1990) (promotion of asso-
ciate professor to full time professor would have created new and distinct contractual
relationship between professor and university); Green v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 728 F.Supp.
768, 777 (D.D.C. 1989) (black former shoe store employee's promotion to any of various
management positions would have created new and distinct contractual relationship).
224. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 621 (1988) (order for reargu-
ment) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
225. Those cases include: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115
(1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 109 S.
Ct. 2261 (1989); and Patterson. The Act begins by criticizing the Court:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS. - Congress finds that -
(1) in a series of recent decisions addressing employment discrimination
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bill included an amendment to section 1981 that brings it in line
with the interpretation the Court has given to section 1982: the
proposed amendment created a new subsection, section 1981(b),
that directs the court to look beyond the discrete act of "enter-
ing into a contract" to determine whether the effects of the act
reveal an abridgment of the right to contract free of racial dis-
crimination. Section 12 of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 provided:
Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42
U.S.C. § 1981) is amended -
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "All persons within"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(b)" For purposes of this section, the right to 'make and en-
force contracts' shall include the making, performance, modifica-
tion and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all bene-
fits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual
relationship.2"
By guaranteeing equality in the "benefits, privileges, terms and
conditions" of the contract, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 guaran-
teed equality in the effect of the right to contract by unequivo-
cally bringing within section 1981's scope the postformation con-
duct of the contracting parties.
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was debated in the House and
Senate during the spring and summer of 1990 and was passed by
both houses in October.27 But on October 21, 1990, George
Bush, claiming that the portion of the bill that addressed the
Wards Cove decision would lead to quotas, vetoed the bill.2"8
claims under Federal law, the Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope
and effectiveness of civil rights protection; and
(2) existing protections and remedies under Federal law are not adequate to
deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate victims of such discrimination.
(b) PURPOSES. - The purposes of this Act are -
(1) to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions; and
(2) to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under Federal
civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation
for victims of discrimination.
H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
226. Id. § 12.
227. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
228. Id. Senate Republican leader, Bob Dole, said during the debates over the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 that the bill would result in "quotas, quotas and more employment
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Three days later, the Senate failed to override the President's
veto by one vote.22 '
The defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 notwithstanding,
the prospects for a legislative reversal to the Patterson Court's
decision remain hopeful. The proposed amendment to section
1981 was not the cause of the Act's defeat, and the President has
expressed support for the amendment.23 If the amendment to
section 1981. can be enacted, it will provide contracting parties
with the same broad protection that section 1982 provides to te-
nants and homeowners. With equality of effect guaranteed, the
equal right to contract envisioned by the authors of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 will finally be realized.
Christopher Mellevold
quotas." Id. However, Senator Brock Adams called the President's veto "a political move
to try to get to conservative, Democratic blue-collar workers" among whom employment
quotas are reportedly unpopular." Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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